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Events in recent years have highlighted the im-
portant relationships between monetary policy and
the regulations governing financial markets and
institutions. In particular, deposit-rate ceilings have
emerged as one of the most important of these
financial regulations, and the deregulation ofthese
ceilings has triggered speculation as to the con-
tinued usefulness ofthe narrow transaction measure
of the money supply-MI-that has most often
been used by the Federal Reserve as its primary
monetary policy guide. This paper analyzes how the
effectiveness of MI targeting has been affected by
the recent round ofdeposit rate deregulation which
occurred with the introduction ofSuper-NOW and
Money Market Deposit Accounts. It also assesses
the prospects for successfully implementing an MI-
targeting approach to policy in the future, when all
deposit-rate ceilings are removed.
Some economists and policymakers have argued
that deposit rate deregulation is prima facie evi-
dence that targeting the monetary aggregates, espe-
cially the narrow MI aggregate, will no longer be
desirable. In the second half of 1982, the Federal
Reserve expressed its doubts about the reliability of
MI by placing less than the usual weight on this
measure in formulating policy.
Some analysts have argued that deregulation will
make the relationship between money and econom-
ic activity unstable by fundamentally altering a key
relationship in the economy-the public's demand
to hold transaction money. I There are two basic
ways in which the demand for money, as measured
by Ml, may be permanently altered by deregula-
tion. First, deregulation may induce a flow ofsav-
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ings balances into MI, and thus contaminate its
basic transactions function. This could make the
public's demand for MI highly unstable because
savings balances tend to be more sensitive than
transaction balances to small changes in the broad
range of interest rate spreads and in investors' sen-
timents. If this occurred, it would make the rela-
tionship between money and the economy more
difficult to predict. However, the results of the
empirical tests presented in this paper cast doubt
on the view that such contamination has already
occurred. The analysis also demonstrates that it is
by no means certain that MI will be seriously con-
taminated even when all deposit rate ceilings are
removed in the future.
Another important effect of deregulation is that
with flexible deposit rates, the opportunity cost
of holding MI may become fairly insensitive to
changes in the general level of market rates of
interest. The associated decline in the responsive-
ness ofthe quantity ofmoney demanded to changes
in the level of market interest rates has both disad-
vantages and advantages. One temporary disadvan-
tage is that more flexible deposit rates wouldchange
the (reduced-form) relationships going from money
to income and other variables. This would increase
the uncertainty in policy decisions for the Federal
Reserve until it understands and becomes proficient
at working with the new relationships.
A permanent disadvantage is that the economy
would become more sensitive to instability in
money demand. However, the evidence thus far
indicates that deregulation has not made Ml notice-
ably less stable. Moreover, the lower responsive-
ness of MI demand to the overall level of interest
rates has the advantage that it insulates the economy
from instability in the public's demand for goods
and services and from unexpected changes in infla-
tion expectations.
Given these pluses and minuses, it is inappro-
priate to conclude that an economy with flexibledeposit rates is not conducive to MI targeting. Al-
though it is too soon to tell for sure, there appears to
be an equally goodchance that Ml will have an even
closer relationship with the macroeconomic vari-
ables whendeposit rates are completelyderegulated.
Deposit deregulation also raises issues concern-
ing short-run monetary control. A lower interest-
responsiveness ofMI demand could possibly make
it less feasible or desirable for the Federal Reserve
to achieve monetary targets in any precise way,
since this precision might involve an unacceptably
high degree of interest rate volatility. Moreover,
even if precise control were exercised, Ml might
become only a contemporaneous or even a lagging
indicator of economic developments, rather than a
leading indicator as it has been in the past. In this
case, even a perfectly predictable demand for
money would not be of high value for monetary
targeting.
The analysis in this paper shows that the serious-
ness of this potential problem in part depends on
whetherornot MI plays the role ofa buffer-stock in
the public's portfolio. Ifit does play this role, these
problems are not likely to be great. If buffer-stock
effects are small, Ml targeting could be seriously
hampered by deposit rate deregulation. Only a
small amount ofevidence on this issue is now avail-
able, but it does support the existence ofsignificant
buffer-stock effects.
The conclusion that we draw from the arguments
and evidence in this paper is that theory is silent on
whether or not Ml-targeting is more or less effec-
tive under flexible deposit rates. The test is an
empirical one. Unfortunately, because deregulation
is not yet complete, conclusive evidence is not
available. The substantial evidence that does exist
suggests that the use ofMI as an intermediate target
has.not been ruined by deregulation and that it
would be advisable forthe Federal Reserve to return
to its former practice of using MI as its primary
monetary aggregate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section I presents the theoretical framework used
for analysis in the paper. Section II discusses the
effects of deregulation on the stability of money
demand. Section III concerns the effects ofderegu-
lation on the responsiveness of money demand to
market interest rates, and how this responsiveness
alters the sensitivity ofthe economy to various types
ofuncertainty. Section IV analyzes potential mone-
tary control problems. Finally, conclusions and
policy implications are discussed in Section V.
I. FrameworkofAnalysis
The model used in this paper is the standard
IS-LM representation ofthe economy expanded to
include a flexible deposit interest rate. The IS-curve
represents combinations ofnominal market interest
rates (i) and real income (y) that produce equilibri-
um in the goods market, for given levels ofexpected
inflation (p*) and the high employment federal
expenditures (G) (Equation I). The LM-curve rep-
resents combinations of nominal market interest
rates and real income that equate the public's
demand for money with the quantity supplied by the
Federal Reserve, given the rate ofreturn on deposits
(z) and the level ofprices, P (Equation 2).
The relationship explaining the rate of return on
the deposits in the money stock is contained in a
third equation (Equation 3). In the absence of de-
posit rate ceilings, the banking system is assumed to
pay the competitive rate ofreturn on these deposits.
This competitive return is held below market rates
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by the extra costs and risks incurred by banks in
(I) y = y(G, i-P*) + -
(2) M/P = M(y, i- z)
+
(3) z = z ( L, i )
+
offering transaction deposits as compared with
other debt instruments. These extra costs fall into
two categories: those that vary systematically with
market interest rates and those that do not. The
importance of this distinction will become clear in
the analysis below.
Reserve requirements are the primaryexample of
costs that vary with market yields.
2 If transaction
deposits carry a reserve requirement of x percent,
banks incur a reserve requirement "tax" of xi per
dollar ofdeposit. In a competitive banking system,
banks will pass this "tax" on to the depositors byholding the rate on deposits (z) below the rate on
market instruments to the extentofxi. Forexample,
ifthe reserve requirement ratio is 12 percent and the
market interest rate is 10 percent, the reserve re-
quirement wedge between market and deposit rates
would be 1.2 percentage points. Thus, reserve re-
quirements can be an important factor in determin-
ing the opportunity cost of holding money (i-z),
which, in turn, is a key determinant ofthe public's
demand for money (Equation 2). Reserve require-
ment costs also cause the opportunity cost ofhold-
ing money (i-z) to vary positively with market rates.
Forexample, with a reserve requirement ratio of 12
percent, an increase in the market rate of I percent-
age point induces a rise in the deposit rate of 0.88
percentage point. The opportunity cost of holding
money therefore increases by 0.12 percentage point.
There also may be factors holding interest rates
ontrasaction deposits below market rates thatdo not
vary systematically with market interest rates
(represented by the variable L in Equation 3). The
primary example is the liquidity premium that
can be expected to stand between transaction
deposit rates and rates on less liquid substitutes.
From the bank's viewpoint, this premium should
exist because ofthe added risk incurred when insti-
tutions borrow funds through instruments payable
ondemand (transaction deposits) and lend the funds
out through longer-term instruments.
3 Banks''pro-
duce" liquidity by transforming maturities in this
way. However, the "production" process involves
the risk ofpotential losses that would occur if(mar-
ket determined) borrowing costs rose above (fixed)
lending rates. Banks protect themselves from this
added risk by maintaining equity cushions, and by
making the yield on transaction deposits lower than
that available on other less liquid deposits and on
open market instruments. The depositor is willing
to accept a lower interest rate on a transaction
deposit because its added liquidity has economic
value. The price that this liquidity commands in the
market is the reduction in the interest rate on trans-
action deposits. Thus, for example, a liquidity pre-
mium can be expected to stand between the yields
on transaction deposits and Treasury bills in much
the same way as a premium stands between three-
month and one-yearTreasury bills.
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When deposit rate ceilings are in place, the para-
meters of Equation 3 obviously are different from
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when deposit rates are deregulated. Iffixed deposit
rate ceilings (such as the 5% percent ceiling on
regular NOW accounts) were fully effective, the
variable L simply would represent the negative of
the constant ceiling rate, and the variable i would
drop out of the function. However, it is unrealistic
to assume that deposit rate regulations have been
fully effective in the U.S., since there are va..-ious
ways in which implicit fonns ofcompensation can
be paid by banks. It is reasonable to assume that
competition for deposits will induce banks to ex-
ploit these methods. Thus, even under deposit-rate
ceilings, it is more accurate to assume that z varies
with i (although not as fast as without regulations)
and that the level ofcompensation is above the fixed
legal ceiling by some unspecified amount.
A final characteristic ofall three equations is that
they are not known with certainty. Ifthis uncertain-
ty were not present, the Federal Reserve would
always be able to achieve what ever nominal
income goal it set for itself. In other words, the
uncertainty is the source of monetary policy prob-
lems. Although uncertainty cannot be eliminated,
there are means of altering its probable effects on
the economy. These include changing the way in
which monetary policy is conducted by the Federal
Reserve (for example, using monetary aggregates
rather than interest rate targeting), or changing
the regulations and laws that govern the financial
system. The latter issue is the main subject of this
paper.
The complete model can be summarized in terms
of the familiar IS-LM diagram in Chart I. The
IS-curve is simply the plot ofEquation I in terms of
interest rates and income, for given levels of ex-
pected inflation and fiscal policy stimulus. A band
is plotted to reflect the degree of uncertainty. The
LM-curve is obtained by substituting the deposit
rate setting Equation 3 into the money demand
Equation 2. A band is plotted to denote the degree of
uncertainty. For given monetary policy settings,
defined by M under monetary aggregates targeting,
the model predicts an outcome for real income ofY.
However, the uncertainty about the relationships in
the model means that y could end up anywhere in
the range ofYI to Y2 with some specifiedconfidence
level.
The analysis below focuses on how deposit rate
deregulation affects the risks present in a monetarypolicy conducted in terms ofmonetary targeting. It
shows how deregulation affects the width of the
YI -Y2 range. Deposit-rate deregulation potentially
can alter these risks by changing two important
properties of the LM-curve. First deregulation
could affect the stability or predictability of the
public's demand for money, both temporarily dur-
ing a transition period, and also pennanently. In
otherwords, deregulation might increase the size of
the band ofuncertainty around the LM-curve. This
potential "instability" effect and its influence on
the effectiveness ofmonetary aggregate targeting is
discussed in Section II. Second, deregulation could
reduce the responsiveness of the LM-curve to
changes in market interest rates by allowing the
deposit rate to move more closely with market rates.
This "interest-elasticity" effect, which makes the
LM-curve more vertical, is discussed in SectionsIiI
and IV.
II. Effects of Deregulation-Stabilityof Money Demand
In cataloging the effects ofdeposit rate deregula-
tion on money demand, it is useful to distinguish
between the adjustment effects during the transition
period aftera regulatory change and the equilibrium
effects which persist after full adjustment has been
made. During the adjustment period, the level of
M I the public wishes to hold at given levels of
income, prices and market interest rates may
change. Thesechanges have beencalled "shifts" in
the demand for money. The deregulation of yields
on transaction deposits temporarily causes the de-
mand for Ml to shift up, as the public pursues the
more attractive yields. The introduction of NOW
accounts on a national basis in 1981 is a case in
point. It raised the questions, by how much would
the demand for Ml (including NOWs) rise in re-
sponse to the higherceiling rate available on check-
able deposits, and how long would this adjustment
take to run its course? Whenever such an upward
shift is taking place, the LM-curve shifts to the left
and tends to make policy more contractionary than
would otherwise be the case. This can temporarily
throw monetary policy off course as it is difficult
to estimate the size and duration ofthe shift while it
is occurring.
More important than the transitional problem is
the potential permanent instability in money de-
mand that could result from deregulation: it could
become more difficult to predict the quantity ofMI
the public demands. This problem could arise be-
cause higher yields on the deposits in MI could
induce the public to use it as a savings vehicle to a
more significant degree than in the past.
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Conceptually, one would expect the public's de-
mand for a transaction aggregate (such as MI) to
have a closer relationship with income and prices
than a savings-type aggregate (such as M2) because
there are few close substitutes for the medium of
exchange. But if the public were to comingIe in
Ml the funds it holds for investment purposes, MI
wouldbecome more like the various financial assets
held for investment purposes, and changes in MI
could be dominated at various times by shifts in the
composition ofthe public's portfolio rather than by
changes in income and prices.
For example, the demand for Ml might become
Chart 1
LM
ISmore highly responsive to fluctuations in the
,'normal" spreads between the rate ofreturn onM1
and rates paid on a wide range of liquid financial
instruments not included in Ml. It also might
become more sensitive to changes in yields onlong-
term bonds and common stocks. Shifts in investors'
preferences for various maturities and liquidity
characteristics would have larger effects on rvH
demand, as would changes in precautionary motives
over the business cycle. Since the demand for Ml
might respond sensitively to a number ofdifficult-
to-measure incentives, it might be difficult to pre-
dict the quantity ofMl demanded by the public. Put
differently, an Ml demand function estimated in
terms ofthe traditional arguments ofincome, prices
and a market interest rate might frequently show
signs ofinstability.
The problems that such instability can cause for a
monetary policy oriented around MI-targeting can
be illustrated with the IS-LM diagram in Chart 1.
Greater instability in Ml demand would show up as
a wider band ofuncertainty in the LM-curve. This
wider band would increase the range of outcomes
for income (YI-Y2 would become larger) for any
given setting for M 1.
NOWs, Super-NOWs, and MMDAs
There is a considerable amount ofevidenceavail-
able concerning the effects of deregulation on
money demand during transition periods. This evi-
dence also sheds light on the seriousness ofpoten-
tial permanent problems with instability in money
demand resulting from the mixing of savings and
transaction balances. IfMl were contaminated by
savings balances, this would show up first as a
temporary shift in the demand for Ml, as savings
balances were shifted into that aggregate. There
should therefore be a positive association between
the size ofupwardshiftsduring the transition period
following deregulation and the probability that Ml
has been permanently contaminated.
An earlier paper surveyed and analyzed the evi-
dence ofmoney demand instability during the tran-
sition periods following two episodes ofderegula-
tion prior to 1982-83.
5 Both episodes were related
to growth in regular NOW accounts (with fixed
ceilings): the introductionofNOW accounts in New
England in the 1970s and the nationwide introduc-
tion of NOW accounts in January 1981. The study
found that these effects on M1demand have been
relatively small. In New England's case, NOW
accounts caused an upward Ml shift of not more
than 5 percent over five years; in the nationwide
case, NOWs raised the demand for Ml by no more
than 3 percent in 1981. Moreover, some evidence
suggests that the effect on M1 in 1981 was far
smallerthanthe studyquotedorevennon-existent.
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The most recent and far-reaching example of
deposit-rate. deregulation occurred when federal
regulators authorized commercial banks and thrift
institutions to issue the Money Market Deposit Ac-
count (MMDA) in December 1982 and the Super-
NOW account in January 1983. The MMDA is free
of interest rate ceilings, has a $2,500 minimum
denomination, and allows six transfers to third par-
ties permonth (three ofwhich may be checks). The
Super-NOW account (which is not available to bus-
inesses) is also subject to a $2,500 minimum de-
nomination and is free of interest rate ceilings. An
important distinguishing feature is that it has unlim-
ited check-writing privileges.
Taken together, these two accounts mean that for
the first time since the GreatDepression, depository
institutions are permitted by law to offer checkable
deposits that are not subject to interest rate ceilings.
This case ofderegulation differs from the introduc-
tion ofnationwide NOWs in 1981 in two important
respects. First, the recent case completely removed
interest rate ceilings instead of imposing anew
higher, but fixed ceiling. (This feature of Super-
NOWs is the focus of the analysis in Section III.)
Second, ceilings were removed not only from trans-
action accounts (Super-NOWs), but also from close
substitutes for transaction accounts (MMDAs).
The latter point means that unlike earliercases of
deregulation, the direction of the potential shift in
money demand cannot be determined from theory.
The effects of the introduction of Super-NOWs
should induce positive flows offunds into Ml from
unregulated instruments and especially from
accounts that carry interest rate ceilings. Other
potential sources offunds include passbook savings
accounts and time deposits with interest rate ceil-
ings, and money market mutual funds.
In contrast, the introduction of the MMDA
should temporarily depress Ml growth. The public
may, for one, use it as a cash management tool to
reduce holdings oftrue transaction balances. With-
31in the regulatory limitations on MMDAs, regular
transfers offunds between them andthe fully check-
able deposits in Ml would allow the public to re-
duce the level of Ml needed to conduct a given
volume of transactions. Another reason for shifts
out of Ml into the MMDA is that the new account
is, to a limited extent, a transaction instrument
itself. Use of the MMDA to write a few large
checks, such as mortgage or credit card payments,
would mean that some transaction funds in the new
account never have to pass through an Ml balance.
Finally, Ml presumably contains some savings-
type balances that are notactually used bythe public
for making transactions. These funds are probably
lodged in traditional NOWs, which carry maximum
yields that are competitive with passbook savings
accounts. The higher yields and liquidity of
MMDAs, however, should attract most of these
funds away from MI.
In sum, shifts into MMDAs add up to a poten-
tially significant reduction in the public's demand
for MI. Theextentto whichthese shiftsdepress MI,
and thereby offset the expansionary effects of the
Super-NOW account, depends partly on the pricing
policies institutions adopt for the two accounts.
That is, it depends on the parameters in the deposit-
rate setting Equation 3. If yields on MMDAs are
considerably more attractive than those on Super-
NOWs (because of a liquidity premium and the
difference in reserve requirements), therecouldbea
net outflow of M I funds into MMDAs. It is also
possible that Super-NOWs are priced attractively
enough to offset the outflow from M I, or to cause
a net inflow. Forthese reasons, theory cannottell us
very much about the direction of the transitory ef-
fects. MI demand could have shifted upward, mak-
ing policy tighter than it appeared in 1983, or the
opposite could have occurred. Similarly, theory
cannot tell whether deregulation contaminated Ml
by attracting savings balances into Super-NOWs, or
purified MI by attracting savings balances already
in MI into MMDAs.
Empirical Evidence in 1983
As noted earlier, there is good reason to expect
that MMDA yields should exceed yields on Super-
NOWs. This expectation has been borne out by
subsequent events. The average interest paid on
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Super-NOWs from March through September 1983
has been below that of MMDAs by from 1.07 to
1.41 percentage points (see Chart 2). Using the
one-month commercial paper rate as the interest
rate, reserve requirement costs can be seen to
accountforbetween oneand I]/s percentagepointof
this spread in March through September 1983, so
theredoes appearto be a small additional spreaddue
to otherfactors.
The explicit rates ofinterest quoted here may not
give a very accurate indication of the true yields
available on these instruments for certain deposits,
the reason being that many institutions have at-
tached various fees, including fixed monthly
charges that are larger for smaller deposits,7 to the
instruments. However, these fees are not likely to
affect a consumer's decision atthe margin to add an
additional dollar of savings balances to a Super-
NOW versus an MMDAsince the fixed charges that
must be paid are unaffected by the decision. Thus,
the interest rate spreads shown in Chart 2 probably
give a good indication ofthe spreadofyields (at the
margin) that help determine where savings balances
end up.
Although it is clearthat consumers can earn more
on their savings balances if they put them into
MMDAs than in Super-NOWs, it is still possible
that the premiumon MMDAs is not large enough to
prevent substantial mixing. This could be the case,
for example, ifexplicit or implicit transaction costs
between the two accounts were large enough to
overcome the yield advantage associated with
MMDAs. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain reliable estimates ofthese
transaction costs, especially since they necessarily
include the value consumers place on the time and
"trouble" associated with managing liquid funds.
This paper employs two other methods of esti-
mating how much Ml has been distorted by recent
deregulation: workdone by the Staffofthe Boardof
Governors of the Federal Reserve System using
surveys of depositors and cross-sectional econo-
metric techniques to estimate the magnitudes ofthe
various flows of liquid funds following the recent
deregulation,8 and econometric estimates and simu-
lations of a demand-for-transaction-deposits equa-
tion to see if there is evidence of a "shift" in the
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Transaction Deposit Demand Equations
A. Variable Interest Elasticity Specification
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growth rates to actual growth. Ifthe demand for MI
shifted with the introduction of the new accounts,
this should show up as large cumulative under-fore-
casts by the end ofthe period.
The results of our experiment are presented in
Table 2. They show that the variable interest elas-
ticity Ml demand equation over-forecasted Ml
growth by a small amount. This result is inconsis-
tent with the hypothesis that Ml-demand shifted up
As of September 1983, MMDAs had reached
$367 billion (about 17 percent ofM2), while Super-
NOWs reached $35 billion (about 61 /2 percent of
MI).9 The survey and econometric cross-section
evidence suggests that the net distorting effect of
this growth in Super-NOWs and MMDAs on Ml
was small. With respect to MMDAs, the major
sources of huge increases appear to be passbook
savings accounts, small denomination time de-
posits, large denomination timedeposits and money
market mutual funds. Small amounts of funds are
estimated to have been transferred from Treasury
securities, other market instruments, demand de-
posits and regular NOW accounts. The last two
categories are the only ones that would affect Ml
growth, and they would apparently have contrib-
uted to a small downward shift in MI.
This same evidence indicates that the bulk of
dollars placed in Super-NOWs came from other
transaction accounts in Ml, including demand de-
posits and regular NOWs. A small amount offunds
probably came from non-Ml sources, including
passbook savings and small time deposits. These
latter movements would contribute a small upward
shift in M1 demand that would tend to offset the
small downward shift caused by funds transferred
from transaction accounts to MMDAs.
Our own method ofanalysis consists ofexamin-
ing temporal econometric evidence on the behavior
of the public's demand for transaction balances in
the period after the dergulation ofdeposit rates-in
December 1982 and January 1983. We employed
conventional equations for the public's demand for
transaction deposits. The equations specify Ml as a
function of the six-month commercial paper rate,
the personal consumption expenditure price de-
flator, and real personal income. Two alternative
variations of this equation were used, one which
restricted the interest elasticity to be constant, and
another which allowed that elasticity to vary posi-
tively with the level ofinterest rates.
These equations were used to determine ifgrowth
in Ml after November 1982 was consistent with the
historical demand relationship. We estimated the
equations over the January 1970 through November
1982 period (see Table I) and (dynamically)
simulated them over the period December 1982-
August 1983. We then compared the simulated Ml-
33with recent deregulation. The constant elasticity
equation under-forecast MI growth by 0.9 percent
(at an annual rate), but this is a very small error
compared with the standard error ofthe regression.
These results therefore tend to confirm the survey
and cross-sectional results which failed to find
evidence of a shift in the public's demand-for-
transaction-deposit equation following the recent
deregulation.
1O
This evidence has two implications. First, insta-
bility in MI demanddoes not appear to have signifi-
cantly distorted monetary policy in 1983.
11 Second,
if MI were to be permanently contaminated by an
inflow of savings balances, this would most likely
have shown up as an upward shift in MI demand
during the transition period following deregulation.
By not finding such a shift, this paper supports the
view that the recent important round of deposit
deregulation has not materially changed the trans-
action nature ofMIY
tion ofhousehold savings and transaction balances,
the same may also be true of corporate balances.
Corporations, even small ones, are likely to manage
their liquid balances more closely than do most
households, and they have a wider variety ofliquid
investment alternatives available to them than
do households.
Second, at least since the mid-1970s, deposit rate
ceilings have effectively been circumvented by
many large corporations. Banks often pay implicit
returns On demand deposit balances through ar-
rangements whereby the balances that corporations
wish to hold are counted as payment for operational
and credit services. For example, business custom-
ers can pay for loan commitments with dollars held
in demand deposit accounts. In the case of opera-
tional services, dollars held in the checking account
are multiplied by the implicit rate of return to be
paid on the account, and the result of this calcula-
tion is counted as paymentfor services. Services not
paid for by these deposits often can be covered
Prospectsforthe Future through explicit fees.
1J
The preceding analysis and evidence pertain only With regard to operational services, interviews
to deposits held by households. Although house- with corporate treasurers and bankers suggest that
hold deposits have been largely deregulated, corpo- (implicit) returns on checking account balances
rations still are prohibited from holding any interest- generally have been set at some open market rate
bearing account that is fully checkable. This leaves (for example, the three-month Treasury bill rate)
open the possibility that MI could be adversely minus the cost to the bankofreserve requirements,
affected by the deregulation of corporate demand and usually have been adjusted according to market
deposits at some time in the future. There are, rates on a monthly or quarterly basis. Thus, many
however, two reasons to believe that the effects of corporations appear to have earned (marginal)
this deregulation on MI may not be large. First, the returns roughly at the competitive rate, presumably
evidence presented earlier suggests that the intro- close to the rate they would have eamed under
duction of Super-NOWs has not caused a major deregulated deposit rates. The interviews also sug-
inflow of savings balances into MI. If the yield gest that these competitive yield spreads were large
spread between MMDAs and Super-NOWs has enough to induce most ofthe corporations to mini-
been large enough to preserve a reasonable separa- mize their checking account balances for a given
Table 2
Growth in M1 minus Currency
(at Annual Rates)
Period Actual
A. Variable Interest ElasticitySpecification:
December 1982
through
August 1983 12.8 percent
B. Constant Interest Elasticity Specification:
December 1982
through









+0.9 percentvolume of transactions. Liquid funds in excess
of this transaction demand were put into higher
yielding savings-type instruments. In this way, the
transaction and investment funds are effectively
separated. There is thus a sizable component of
corporate transaction balances that is unlikely to
be significantly affected by future deposit-rate de-
regulation because it has already been" deregulated
de facto."
III. Effects of Deregulation-ResponsivenessofMoney Demand
to Market Interest Rates
checking accounts apparently have responded fairly
sensitively to market rates. However, it does appear
reasonable to conclude that rates on consumer de-
posits will be more flexible and move significantly
more closely with market rates after full deregula-
tion than before.14
Implicit returns paid to households prior to the
authorization ofSuper-NOWs appeared to have re-
sponded quite sluggishly to movements in market
rates. Since part of that sluggishness presumably
reflected the costs ofadjusting implicit compensa-
tion, Super-NOW rates for consumers should be
more variable than implicit returns. This expecta-
tion has been borne out so far by the experience with
yields on Super-NOWs. As shown in Chart 2,
Super-NOW rates appear to have moved fairly flex-
ibly along with MMDA rates. However, this evi-
dence is not conclusive because market rates have
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The second aspect of concern over interest rate
deregulation is related to the potential for perma-
nent changes in the responsiveness of the demand
for MI to movements in marketrates ofinterest, and
how these changes will affect the money-to-income
relationship. A key question in this regard is how
sensitive depository institutions will be to move-
ments in market yields when they adjust their offer
rates on checkable deposits. Since the opportunity
cost ofholding Ml is the spread between the market
rate and the deposit rate, adjusting deposit rates to
closely follow market rates would make the oppor-
tunity cost ofMI vary much less than market rates.
Thus, changes ofa given size in the demand for Ml
would correspond to large changes in market inter-
est rates: that is, the elasticity ofMl with respect to
market rates would be smaller.
This point is illustrated by Equations 2 and 3.
Equation 2, the money demand function, states that
the public's demand for money varies inversely
with the opportunity costofholding money (i - z).
Equation 3, the bank deposit-rate setting equation,
defines how this opportunity cost varies with mar-
ket rates. When deposit-rate ceilings are fully effec-
tive, deposit rates do not vary with market rates. In
such a case, changes in the opportunity cost of
holding money wouldbe equalto changes in market
interest rates, and the LM-curve would have a posi-
tive slope as shown in Chart I. At the otherextreme,
banks might vary deposit rates in tandem with mar-
ket rates. In this case, the opportunity cost ofhold-
ing money would be invariant with changes in mar-
ket rates, and the opportunity cost variable (i ~ z)
would drop-out ofthe money demand equation. In
this situation, the LM-curve in Chart I would be
completely vertical.
As noted earlier, these assumptions obviously are
overstatements of the regulated and deregulated
worlds, respectively, since regulations on rates of
return paid on transaction deposits have not been
fully effective. Implicit returns on (large) corporate
35There has not been a real test of how quickly
banks will change Super-NOW rates in response to
a sizeable change in market rates. Possibly more
convincing is the evidence that banks have quite
flexibly varied rates on otherconsumerdeposits that
were deregulated in recent years. Agoodexample is
the money market certificate authorized in mid-
1978, Rates on these instruments have moved vir-
tually in tandem with the six-month Treasury bill
rate., Corresponding to this regulatory change, the
responsiveness ofM2 demand to changes in market
rates fell sharply in mid-1978 (the elasticity is esti-
mated to have dropped from -0.28 in 1960/Q4-
1978/Q2 to -0.06 in 1978/Q3-l98I/Q4.)15
Ofcourse, it is unlikely that the opportunity cost
ofholding MI will be totally invariant in relation to
the market rate even when deposit rate ceilings are
completely removed. The l2-percent reserve re-
quirement on transaction deposits will be sufficient
to impart a small positive movement in the oppor-
tunity cost as market rates change. But this positive
movement is likely to be significantly smaller than
it was prior to full deregulation.
Money Demand Stability
It isimportant to recognize that deposit-rate de-
regulation not only raises the possibility that money
demand will become less stable, it also increases the
importance of having a stable demand function for
money. One possible effectofderegulation, then, is
that when deposit rates are flexible, unanticipated
"shifts" in the demand curve for money, at given
levels of money supplied, are likely to have larger
effects on income.
To illustrate this point, assume that the public's
demand for money shifts up, and that the Fed holds
the money supply constant. With more money de-
mand and the same money supply, interest rates rise
and income falls. When deposit rates are inflexible,
the increase in nominal market interest rates lowers
the quantity of money demanded somewhat, and
thus causes income to drop by less than if deposit
rates rose along with market rates. This partial off-
set is not as large when deposit rates are flexible,
since in that case the increase in market rates has
only a small effect on the opportunity cost ofhold-
ing money, and thus does not affect money de-
mand significantly. This point can be illustrated
with the IS-LM diagram in Chart 1. As noted earlier,
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as the deposit rate moves more closely with the
market rate, the LM-curve becomes more vertical.
Instability in money demand causes the LM-curve
to shift for given levels ofthe money supply. With a
more vertical LM-curve under deregulation, these
shifts have larger effects on interest rates and
income.
Fiscal Policy
Anothereffectofinterest rate deregulation is that
it reduces the impact offiscal policy on income. As
a result, fiscal policy actions would not have to be
correctly anticipatedby the Federal Reserve for it to
achieve its income goals. This should enhance the
chance that the Fed will be able to correctly forecast
the monetary targets that are consistent with its
macroeconomic goals.
The reason that fiscal policy would have less
effect on income for given levels ofMl is that there
would be more financial crowding-out in the short-
run with flexible deposit rates. 16 When the high
employment deficit increases, the first round effect
is that real GNP rises. However, ifthe Fed holds to
its money target, interest rates will rise as the higher
GNP causes money demand to increase in excess of
the fixed money supply. With higher interest rates,
part ofthe initial increase in GNP is crowded-out as
firms and households cut back on their spending for
durable goods. This crowding out is greater with
flexible deposit rates because market interest rates
rise by more, that is, higher market rates feed back
on deposit rates which, in tum, induce further in-
creases in market rates. As a consequence, the link
between money and income would be less respon-
sive to changes in fiscal policy with flexible deposit
rates. In terms ofthe IS-LM diagram, amore expan-
sionary fiscal policy causes the IS-curve to shift to
the right. The more vertical is the LM-curve, the
smaller is the effect ofthe IS-shift on income.
Inflation Expectations
Interest rate deregulation can also improve the
money-to-income relationship by insulating income
from changes in inflation expectations. For ex-
ample, a decrease in inflation expectations (all
else being equal) reduces nominal interest rates and
thus raises the,demand for money when deposit
rates are not flexible. With higher money demand
and the same money supply, income must fall.These changes in income can be a majorproblem at
various times because expected inflation is inher-
ently uncertain anddifficult to estimate. This poten-
tial problem is less serious with flexible deposit
rates because the opportunity costofholding money
does not vary as much with changes in market
interest rates.
The effect on the opportunity cost of holding
money would come into play, for example, when
inflation falls as the result of past tight monetary
policy. With fixed deposit rates, this will necessi-
tate temporarily higher growth rates in the money
supply to accommodate the increased money de-
mand associated with lower nominal interest rates.
Otherwise, the drop in inflation would lead to a
monetary policy that is more contractionary than
originally intended. Since it is often difficult to
forecast in advance when and by how much infla-
tion will respond to money growth in any given
year, potentially large problems can occur as a re-
sult of the impact of inflation on velocity. This
problem was dramatically illustrated in 1982 and
early in 1983, when an unexpectedly sharp decline
in inflation led to a decline in nominal interest rates
and a surge in the quantity of money demanded.'7
The Fed responded to the continuing weakness in
the economy, and to the unusual behavior ofMI by
allowing MI growth to exceed the upper boundary
of its 1982 target range by a wide margin. These
problems would have been smaller if deposit rates
had been flexible, since the drop in market rates
would have induced a smaller increase in the de-
mand for money.
Consumption and Capital Investment
A final result to deposit rate deregulation is that it
would reduce the effect of unexpected shifts in the
IS-curve (due to changes in the public's demand for
goods and services) on the money-income relation-
ship. With fixed deposit rates, swings in investment
and consumption spending that are not forecasted
by the Fed can have sizeable unexpected effects on
income, for given levels of Ml. Under flexible
deposit rates, changes in market interest rates lead
to only small changes in the opportunity cost of
holding money, and thus, income stays closer to its
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forecasted value for given levels ofMI.
New Relationships
The preceding analysis suggests the following
conclusions regarding the impact of deposit rate
deregulation. First, deregulation insulates income
from a numberoffactors that otherwise could cause
it to change unexpectedly. These factors include
fiscal policy actions, changes in inflation expecta-
tions, and instability in the public's demand for
goods and services. The price paid forthese benefits
is an increase in the destabilizing effects on income
of instability in the demand for money. It is there-
fore crucial in an assessment ofthe effectiveness of
monetary targeting under flexible deposit rates to
gauge the impact on money demand stability.
The empirical evidence examined in Section II
suggests that problems with unstable money de-
mand may be small. However, it is important to
recognize that even if the LM-relationship were
more stable and predictable after deregulation than
before, deregulation still may temporarily raise un-
certainties for monetary targeting by quantitatively
altering the responses of changes in income and
interest rates to changes in money. This would
occur if deregulation made the LM-curve signifi-
cantly more vertical. In such a case, a given change
in the money supply would have a larger effect on
income and interest rates, at least in the intermedi-
ate run when income adjusts to monetary policy but
prices do not.
In the context of stabilization policy, a more
vertical LM-curve means that smaller changes in
money would be required to achieveagiven change
in income. As long as the LM-curve remained
stable and predictable, a more vertical LM-curve
would not permanently cause problems for mone-
tary targeting. But, the Fed could face considerable
uncertainty during the period in which it was learn-
ing the new (reduced form) relationships. Ofcourse,
these statements apply to stabilization policy only.
Deregulation would not affect the important long-
run (or steady-state) properties of the macro-econ-
omy. Money would still be neutral in the long-run,
affecting inflation but not real GNP.IV. Monetary Control
The successful use of monetary aggregates tar-
gets requires that two basic conditions be satisfied:
that the money-to-income relationship be relatively
stable in the sense ofbeing predictable, and that the
Federal Reserve be able to achieve its monetary
aggregates targets. In the analysis thus far, we have
focused on how money affects income and assumed
that monetary control was not a problem. In this
section, we analyze the monetary control issue.
Monetary control generally is viewed as occur-
ring in the short-run environment in which income
and prices are fixed: that is, when the IS-curve is
vertical. Analysis ofthis monetary control environ-
ment shows thateven ifthe demand for money were
stable under flexible deposit rates, there would be
additional reasons to be concerned about the effec-
tiveness ofMI targeting afterdeposit-rate deregula-
tion. Some observers argue that with flexible depos-
it rates, MI will no longer be a leading indicator
of the pace of economic activity and inflation; it
will merely be a contemporaneous reflection of
economic conditions .18 Moreover, they argue that
deposit rate deregulation will make it difficult and
undesirable for the Federal Reserve to control MI in
the short-run of, say, a calendar quarter because
such control could induce disruptive volatility in
interest rates.
These points can be illustrated by describing the
conventional view of how monetary control works
and how this process fits into a full macroeconomic
model. Suppose the Fed wants to lower the total
spending ongoods and services in the economy. Ifit
followed an intermediate targeting procedure, it
would lower the target for money. According to the
conventional view ofmonetary control, in the short-
run (in which income is exogenous), the Fed would
attempt to achieve this lower target by reducing its
reserve operating instrument and thereby raising
market interest rates. With deposit-rate ceilings in
place, "bonds" would become more attractive to
the public than the non- or low-interest bearing
checkable deposits in money. The public would
then demand smaller quantities ofmoney-balances
at given levels ofincome and prices, and the money
stock would decline.
By raising the cost of credit, the increase in
interest rates also would eventually (over a longer
38
time period) reduce the public's spending on goods
and services. Since according to empirical research,
the lags from interest rates to MI are shorter than
those from interest rates to the economy, the decline
in money occurs before the decline in economic
ac~ivity. This timing pattern means that money is a
leading indicator of the economy, and, as a result,
has value as anintermediate target.
This view of the MI-targeting process places
great emphasis on deposit-rate ceilings. These ceil-
ings ensure that money is a less attractive asset to
the public at high money-market rates than at low
rates. Thus, "tight" monetary policies, which
eventually reduce economic activity, show up first
in reductions in money via money demand. Without
deposit-rate ceilings, this result is far less certain. If
banks raise rates on MI deposits in tandem with
money market rates, higher rates would have little
effect on the relative attractiveness of securities
versus money and there would be little effect on the
quantity of money demanded. Put more formally,
there is no equilibrium between the vertical short-
run IS-curve and a vertical LM-curve that may be
created by deregulation. This would make mon-
etary control difficult at best, and attempts at such
control would lead to extreme fluctuations in inter-
est rates in the short-run.
Without. the ability to influence the spread be-
tween yields'on securities and money (and thus
money demand), the Fed would not be able to
control MI through that mechanism. Higherinterest
rates (induced by lower reserves) would still lower
economic activity with a lag, and this in turn would
reduce the public's demand for MI, but Ml would
merely be acontemporaneous indicatorofthe econ-
omy. Since movements in Ml would no longer
foreshadow movements in GNP, MI would no
longerbe as useful as an intermediate target.
Put differently, the Fed would be forced to for-
mulate short-run policy in terms of the direct link-
age between market rates of interest and income;
that is, it would need to create an equilibrium be-
tween the IS and LM curves by making the LM
horizontal through interest rate targeting. Since
income affects money demand, it would be possible
under such interest rate operating procedures to
control money through income. However, therewould be no advantage in formulating policy in this
way, since income is the ultimate target of policy.
Thus, the relationship between money and income
could be perfectly stable, and yet be oflittle use to
policymakers because Ml would not be subject to
their control in the short run. 19
The preceding example is obviously an extreme
case. It is unlikely that the Fed would have no
control of Ml through interest rates under flexible
deposit rates. However, it is likely that the respon-
siveness of MI to changes in the overall level of
money market rates would decline significantly.
This, therefore, raises an empirical question: how
much will the interest-responsiveness ofMI decline
in practice? A cut in half, for example, would not
seem to present a significant problem. The Fed
could achieve a given reduction in aggregate
demand simply by lowering MI by half as much
as would have been required prior to deposit-rate
deregulation. However, if the interest-responsive-
ness were to come close to zero, the conventional
view of monetary control implies that the value of
MI as an intermediate target could be damaged
significantly.
Buffer Stocks and the Inventory Theory
Even if deregulation caused the interest-respon-
siveness of Ml demand to become very low, this
might not interfere significantly with the Fed's abil-
ity to control MI. There is an alternative view of
how monetary control works which at leastpartially
neutralizes the potential monetary control problems
associated withdeposit rate deregulation. This view
holds that in addition to the interest rate channels
noted above, monetary control operates directly
through the supply of money provided by the ac-
tions of the Fed and the deposit-creating banking
system. The rationale for this view is that money
acts as a "shockabsorber" orbuffer stock between
the receipts and spending of the public. Short-run
variations in the observed stock of money, there-
fore, would not have to be induced by changes in
people's underlying demand for money; they could
result from independent changes in the quantity of
money supplied that are unrelated to underlying
demand factors such as interest rates and income?O
In this view, money demand is partly passive in
the short-run, accommodating itself to changes in
the supply of money. This view appears to be con-
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sistent with the widely accepted inventory theory of
the transaction demand for money, which empha-
sizes the role of transaction costs in determining
how closely balances are managed. Sudden inflows
or outflows offunds cause inventories ofmoney to
bepushedawayfrom theirunderlyingdesired\<.wels
in the short-run because it is costly for some money
holders to make the frequent adjustments needed to
bring money balances quickly back to desiredlevels.
The relationship between the transaction theory
and the buffer stock function of money can be
il!ustratedby analysis of the Miller-Orr model of
money demand?1 This model expands the classic
inventory-theory of money demand developed by
Baumol and Tobin
22 to include a cash flow that is
not known with certainty by themoneyholder. More
specifically, the Miller-Orr (M-O) model shows
how a cost minimizing money holder manages
transaction balances in the face ofan uncertain cash
flow by balancing two competing costs. First, there
is the opportunity cost of holding transaction bal-
ances (the spread of yields on near money over
those on money), which tends to reduce the quantity
ofmoney demanded. Second, there is the fixed per
transaction fee of raising or lowering money bal-
ances by selling orbuying securities, which tends to
raise the quantity ofmoney demanded.
M-O show that a cost minimizing solution to this
problem is to establish what is called a two-param-
Chart 3
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Timeeter control policy. Under this policy, individuals
establish a maximum cash balance (h) and a mini-
mum cash balance (0). The width of this range
depends positively on the transaction cost and the
variance of the daily cash flow, and negatively on
the opportunitycostofholding money. Balances are
allowed to wander freely within the h-O range (see
Chart 3). It is only when too cash balance reaches h
that a security is purchased, and when it reaches 0
that a security is sold. In both cases, the size ofthe
transaction is chosen to bring the cash balance to
some level H, which lies in the h-O range. In the
long run, the average cash balance varies with the
opportunity cost of holding money and the other
underlying variables noted above. In the short-run,
the cash balance can differ from its average, or
underlying level of demand, depending on cash
flows that are uncertain to the individual. This
model can be regarded as a formal representation of
the buffer stock role of money. Within the h-O
range, money is simply the residual item in
the individual's balance sheet, and changes in
money do not reflect changes in the underlying
demand for money. Rather, within the h-O range,
changes in money are the side-effects ofchanges in
the demands for goods and services, and real and
financial assets.
The implications of this money demand model
can be seen by imagining a worldofMiller-Orrcash
managers in which deposit rates move in tandem
with market rates, making the opportunity cost of
money constant. Now assume that the Federal Re-
serve makes the money supply exogenous through
precise short-run monetary control. In an effort to
achieve its money target, the Fed buys a Treasury
bill from the public. This requires a very small
decrease in Treasury bill rates, just enough to make
the sale attractive in this highly competitive market.
As a by-productofthis transaction, the outstanding
quantity oftransactions money is raised. Ifthe cash
balance of the seller of the T-bill is still inside the
h-O range after the transaction, the newly created
money resides there for a time. Thus, in the short-
run, the quantity of money observed changes in
accordance with the money supply, with a very
small change in interest rates, and with no change in
the underlying demand for money.
Even ifthe T-bill seller's h-O range is pierced, the
new money may not disappear from the economy.
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Instead, it may trigger the purchase of a security
from another money holder. This string of trans-
actions continues until the money ends up within
someone's h-O range. Each time a transaction is
made to rid a portfolio of the newly acquired
money, interest rates are affected a little more ac-
cording to demands and supplies in the securities
markets. If, for example, all money holders had
very wide ranges, it might take a long time for the
new money tobe passed around enough for a large
interestrate effect. Ifranges were small, this might
occur quickly. In either case, with the spread be-
tween market and deposit rates fixed, the money
must continue to be passed around until income
increases to the point where the new money is
demanded. In other words, the underlying money
demand eventually rises enough to absorb the in-
crease in supply.
The conventional view of monetary control can
be viewedas being basedon the empiricaljudgment
that h-O ranges are very small on average. Thus,
injectionsofnew money are passedaroundso rapid-
ly that they almost immediatelycause largedeclines
in interest rates. With fixed deposit ceilings, these
declines translate into a lower opportunity cost of
holding money and thus a higher underlying de-
mand. Over a period short enough that income and
prices cannot adjust, all of the increase in money
supply must be abosrbed through such interest rate
declines. In this circumstance, deposit rate deregu-
lation would cause serious problems for monetary
aggregates targeting if deregulation made the op-
portunity cost of holding money insensitive to Fed
open-market operations. Attempts at short-run
monetary control in this environment could have
destabilizing effects on interest rates, or, at least,
cause wild gyrations in them.
The buffer-stock view of monetary control ar-
gues that h-O ranges are wide enough (on average)
that, even with fully flexible deposit rates, changes
in the money supply would induce only gradual
changes in interest rates that ultimately affect in-
come and prices with a lag.
23 Ml can, therefore, be
controlled in the short-run even ifthe demand for it
is not very responsive to the overall level ofinterest
rates. Moreover, becauseofMI's buffer-stock role,
changes in M I will continue to be a useful leading
indicatoroffuture movements in incomeandprices.
The purpose of the preceding discussion was toestablish that (I) the size ofbuffer-stockeffects is an
issue ofgreat importance for monetary policy in an
era of flexible deposit rates, and that (2) the exis-
tence ofthese effects is primarily an empircal issue.
The theory behind buffer-stock demand appears to
be consistent with the inventory theory of the de-
mand for the medium ofexchange that has come to
be widely accepted by the economics profession.
That is why this issue should be decidedon the basis
ofempirical evidence.
A number ofstudies have used quarterly data to
estimate LM-equations under the assumption that
the money supply is exogenous. These equations
implicitly or explicitly employ buffer-stock specifi-
cations?4 Unfortunately, these equations do not
shed much light on the question being raised here:
in the short run (for example, weeks or months),
would buffer-stock effects significantly moderate
the interest rate fluctuations that otherwise might be
caused by close monetary control with flexible de-
posit rates? One problem in obtaining evidence on
this question is that the buffer-effects in question
would not come into play unless the Fed actually
exogenized money in the short-run. There is ample
evidence that the Fed has done so only sporadic-
ally.25 Substantial direct evidence is therefore not
likely to be available because the Federal Reserve
did not systematically "shock" the public's port-
folio in an attempt to control money.
There is, however, a source ofindirect evidence
having to do with "shocks" from the credit markets
that can occur when the Fed pursues a policy that
stabilizes interest rates. In a world in which there
are distinct markets for bonds (credit) as well as for
money and commodities, it is possible to have exo-
genous changes in the supply ofmoney even when
the monetary authority pegs interest rates?6 Sup-
pose, for example, that firms decide to spend more
on plant and equipment. They may finance this
desired increase in spending by issuing new debt.
Their increased demand for commodities (invest-
ment goods) is thus matched by an increased supply
of debt (demand for credit). Nevertheless, the in-
creased demand for credit puts pressure on interest
rates to rise. To prevent the rise, the monetary
authority increases bank reserves, allowing the
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banking system to purchase the new debt through
the creation of new deposits (i.e., an increase
in money supply). The firms' demand for money
therefore has not increased except in a temporary
sense: they have borrowed the money to spend, not
to hold.
At this point, there is an increase in the supply of
money that is not matched by any increase in the
demand for money. That is, the change in money
supply is exogenous. The firms borrowing the
money will spend it. And the recipients of that
expenditure will find themselves with excess
money balances, at which time, the issue ofthe size
ofbufferstockeffects comes into play.
If buffer-stock effects initiated by changes in
bank lending were found to be significant during
periods when the Fed used a short-term interest rate
as its instrument, it would be reasonable to expect
that buffer-stock effects also would be observed if
the Fed actually exogenizedmoney in the short-run.
For this reason, evidence of a link between bank
lending and the demand for money in the short-run
would provide-indirect evidence ofthe buffer-stock
effects discussed above. The only available evi-
dence on this point (to the author's knowledge) is in
a money market model developed and used at the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
27 In this
model, the short-run (monthly) demand for trans-
action deposits equation specifies the (log) level of
transaction deposits as a function ofthe (log) levels
ofprices, real income, a short-term interest rates,
and the (log) change in bank loans. For reasons
stated above, the bank loan variable is intended to
capture exogenous increases in the money SUpply at
given levels of the short-term interest rate. It was
found to be highly significant, both statistically and
economically, when monthly data for the 1976-82
period was used. This result is consistent with the
view that exogenous changes in the money supply
cause transitory increases in observed money rela-
tive to the underlying demand for it. While this
evidence is not proof in itself, it is sufficient to
establish a working hypothesis that buffer-stock
effects are significant and to demonstrate that fur-
ther research in this area is warranted.V. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has analyzed how the effectiveness of
MI-targeting is likely to be affected by the removal
of regulatory ceilings on the interest banks are per-
mitted to pay on deposits. A major conclusion is
that theory is silent on the issue. There are plausible
theoretical arguments both that deregulation will
make Ml a less reliable intermediate target and that
it will make MI more reliable. Therefore, substan-
tial empirical evidence is needed. The evidence that
is available supports the view that deregulation has
not greatly reduced the reliability ofMl, but given
that deregulation is not complete, policymakers
face uncertainty about how Ml will behave in the
future, when deposit-rates are further deregulated.
However, uncertainty about the behavior of MI
under deregulation does not by itself justify a de-
emphasis of MI in favor of other monetary aggre-
gates, such as M2. A decision to stress other aggre-
gates should be based upon an evaluation of their
reliability relative to MI. Although studies of MI
have been extensive, the behavior of the broader
monetary aggregates in recent years under deposit-
rate deregulation have not received the same at-
tention. The deregulation of yields on M2, for
example, began in earnest in mid-I978 with the
introduction of money-market certificates. The
available evidence on M2 suggests that the relation-
ship between it and income has deteriorated signifi-
cantly sil1ce mid-1978, and that M2 has become less
controllable."H This evidence, together with the
evidence presented in this paper on the stability of
Ml in the 1980s, suggests that M2 has been more
adversely affected by deregulation than Ml. Thus,
unless solid evidence of a major problem with Ml
develops, the Federal Reserve would be well-
advised to place more weight on MI than the
broaderaggregates as intermediate targets ofmone-
tary policy in the future.
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